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ABSTRACT
In the literature on household marketing behavior there is very little
work on within the year variation of grain marketing by individual households,
and in particular the effect of their other assets on the marketing of grain.
This paper will argue that socioeconomic status affects the timing of grain
sales, and that subsistence farmers substitute between grain and other assets
for the generation of income. The data comes from weekly budget surveys
conducted during 15 months with 118 households in three villages in Manga, a
surplus region of Burkina Faso (Upper Volta).
RESUME
La litt~rature sur le comportement d'un mnage par rapport A la
commercialisation peu de la variation saisonniere de la vente de cfrkales. En
particulier, il existe peu de travaux concernant 1' influence des autres avoirs
d'un menage sur la vente de cereales. Ce rapport soutient que le niveau
socio-4conomique exerce une influence sur la prise de d&cision concernant le
moment oi l'on vend des cfreales, et que les paysans dont la production est
orientte vers l'autoconsommation substituent d'autres biens aux cereales pour
gengrer du revenu. Les donnfes proviennent des enquetes hebdomadaires sur le
budget. Ces enquetes ont durs 15 mois et concernent 118 menages dans trois
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Many of the governments of sub-Saharan Af rica intervene directly in their
grain markets. Although their market shares vary, the interventions often
take the form of fixing uniform buying and selling prices throughout the year
for each of the major food staples. There are two important reasons used to
justify this policy: (1) the need to provide regular and inexpensive food to
urban and other grain deficit regions, and (2) the belief that many farmers
are "forced" to sell grain soon after harvest to repay debts and fulfill other
financial obligations, which enables traders to buy grain at very low prices
at harvest. Some studies have been done to examine whether, and for whom,
this second belief is valid, but they have drawn conflicting conclusions.
This may be due to the methodologies used to test the hypotheses, rather than
because the farmers in different regions behave fundamentally differently.
This paper examines the within-year variation of the grain marketing behavior
of individual households: when farmers buy and sell grain, why, and how the
timing of grain transactions relates to the timing of other economic
activities. It specifically addresses the question of whether farmers in
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) are forced to sell grain at harvest.
It is a major premise of this research that when deciding both what to
produce and later what to market the farmer takes into consideration all of
his assets. Farmers produce many products other than grain, such as cash
crops, animals, and artisan goods. Therefore, household behavior with respect
to grain must be examined within the context of the entire household economy,
not as if grain were an isolated output. In addition, it is important to
consider both sales and purchases of grain since many farmers do both. This
approach is wholly consistent with economic theories of resource allocation
and models of production and consumption behavior. It is different, however,
from the standard way in which grain marketing behavior is usually analyzed,
which focuses on sales alone. This approach does not lend itself easily to
using multiple regression. We examine the data from several angles using a
combination of statistical techniques.
Hypotheses about the effect of the household's other assets and its
socioeconomic status on marketing behavior were derived from a three-good,
two-period model of farmer behavior. These hypotheses are tested using data
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from weekly budget surveys collected during 15 months with 116 households in
three villages in Manga, a grain surplus region of Burkina Faso.
The paper begins with a review of the methodologies and findings of other
studies that have investigated the sales behavior of subsistence producers in
West Africa, which points out the ad hoc way this topic has been approached in
the past. The second section briefly discusses the agricultural economy of
Manga, the research site, focusing attention on areas which are important for
developing a model which captures the essential features of the dynamics of
the household economy. Section III summarizes the resource allocation model
used to develop the hypotheses which are the basis of the analysis. Section
IV analyzes the marketing behavior of the sample households.
Section V concludes that there are important differences in marketing
patterns among different socioeconomic groups. The poorer households tend to
be net buyers of grain, while richer farmers are net sellers. Poorer farmers
tend to sell grain at lower prices than wealthier farmers, and they buy grain
at prices higher than those at which they sell. The farmers in the sample
generate more revenue from animal sales than from grain sales. And finally,
it is clear that there are trade-offs between different assets for revenue
generation in different periods. Both rich and poor households tend to rely
relatively more heavily on grain for revenue in the harvest period, and on
animals in the dry season. This behavior is economic given the intraannual
changes in relative prices of different products.
I. REVIEW OF METHODOLOGIES AND FINDINGS OF PAST STUDIES
There is a diverse literature on the marketing behavior of agricultural
households in West Africa. Some studies focus on marketing, usually including
a section on household behavior, and one on the regional or national
distribution system. Others focus on production, but include an analysis of
marketing behavior. A third group, interested in examining the relationships
and mechanisms which affect the farmer's socioeconomic status, looks at
marketing patterns and their effect on the economic status of households.
Within these groups, the analysis of market ing behavior f alls into one of
three categories, according to its principal objective: to describe the
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marketing patterns and interactions of individual households in the market; to
examine the marketing behavior of different producers, and the economic effect
of these various patterns on the household; and to explain observed social
phenomena like poverty cycles and reinforced class structure. Within each
category, the analyses use variations of the same methodology.
There are relatively few studies whose stated purpose is to understand or
describe household marketing behavior, and they are usually coupled with work
on a regional or national marketing system. In each of the works reviewed, a
major purpose is to describe the peasant's interaction with the market, and to
assess the constraints which the marketing system imposes on the producer.
For West Africa, Hays' (1977) study of marketing of foodgrains in northern
Nigeria is the major example. Hays looks at patterns with regard to the
timing and quantity of sales. He is specifically interested in analyzing
whether or not peasants are forced to sell soon after harvest, when prices are
low -- an explanation often given for the large quantities available on the
market during that period. To address this question he calculates the percent
of sales occurring in each of two six-month periods: postharvest, from
September to February; and preharvest, from March to August. Finding that
very little is sold at harvest, he concludes that the peasant is not forced to
market. Approximately 70% of the grain destined for sale is held off the
market until the last six months before the harvest. This, he states, is
consistent with Gilbert's (1970) findings for northern Nigeria: that farmers
held their surpluses for sale in the latter half of the year. This technique
is often used in production studies to describe marketing behavior, in
addition to presenting summary statistics on the quantities and proportion of
the harvest marketed.
In a recent study of the farming system of the eastern region of Burkina
Faso, using a slightly different technique, Michigan State (1980) confirms the
hypothesis of "forced sales". Looking first at the proportion of sales and
purchases occurring in 13 four-week periods, they compare the ratio of sales
to purchases in each period. From this data they conclude that sales occur
primarily at harvest, and purchases during the preharvest hungry season.
Ross (1979), in his study of village level grain transactions in Senegal,
found that most sales (66%) occur in the six postharvest months.
Nevertheless, because sales are divided over this period and occur throughout
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the entire year, he concludes that these data do not support the hypothesis
about "forced sales".
Matlon's (1976) study of income distribution among farmers in northern
Nigeria is an excellent example of research that looks broadly at the
household economy and focuses on the interaction of its various components, of
which marketing of agricultural output is one. Households in different income
strata are presumed to have different marketing patterns. He develops two
different approaches to analyze the differential impact of marketing patterns
on revenue or income, each based on a different assumption about the effect of
price changes on household behavior.
Based on the assumption that household consumption is price elastic, he
calculates a price-adjusted value of the harvest by applying monthly grain
prices to the proportion of each crop sold and domestically consumed in a
given month. Looking at the production shares of each crop stratified by
income class, he infers the distribution of gains and losses due to price
changes. For each income stratum he calculates the gross value of production
less purchases of each crop. Expressed as the percentage of net household
income, this reflects the changes in real income which accompany price
movements. From these statistics he concludes that price changes in
foodgrains affect lower income households more proportionally.
The second approach is based on the assumption that price changes affect
the household's purchasing power. Combining sales and purchase data to
estimate the net impact of price changes on real income, he finds that the
sales/purchases ratio increases with income. He concludes that the poorest
households market a greater proportion of their crop than wealthier households
and also purchase a larger amount.
Matlon also tests a variation of the "forced sales" hypothesis: that lower
income farmers market a greater proportion of their crops soon after harvest
than higher income farmers. Elaborating on the relationship between the
timing of sales and the proportion sold at a particular time, he hypothesizes
that the disposal of a greater proportion of marketed crops immediately
following the harvest coincides with the price-trough period. This implies a
loss in real sales revenues to poorer households relative to wealthier ones
for equivalent volumes marketed. To test this hypothesis he looks at the
proportion of sales by month for each crop.
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Matlon finds that during the observation period there was no consistent
and significant price advantage accruing to higher income households due to
late sales. He also concludes that the difference in net sales revenues
between the richest and poorest households due to timing of sales is not
great. Although not explicitly stated, these conclusions bear on the
discussions about the cycle of poverty, and intensified inequality, themes of
much of the anthropological work on the rural economy in West Africa.
The major works which address the grain economy at the household and
village levels are about the Haussa (Sutter, 1982; Raynaut, 1973; Hill,
1972). Both Raynaut and Hill look at the role of grain trading in
intensifying inequality between actors in the rural economy. Raynaut focuses
on the transactions of a small sample of farmers within a village. He shows
that a large volume of trade does not indicate wealth, but in fact, the
opposite. Not only is a surplus unnecessary for trade to occur, but often
trade takes place because grain stores are insufficient. The terms of trade
are not advantageous to the producer, and therefore his situation is made
worse. Hill also focuses on inequality within the village. She examines
grain transactions as a potential cause of inequality. Both carefully
describe grain trading in the village, including the relationships between
transacting partners.
Sutter is interested in the processes that lead to rural differentiation.
He tries to show that crop production and the level and timing of sales differ
between economic groups, and that those differences are important factors in
the process of inequality. To examine differences in grain sales and purchase
behavior between groups, he divides his sample into four economic groups,
according to the size of household grain stores at harvest (as judged by
prominent villagers). He finds a positive association between sales as a
percentage of net harvest value and relative poverty. In the context of the
small amount (1-3%) of the harvest that was sold, poorer households make a
significantly higher percentage of their sales in the low price period, than
do richer ones. There is a 20 CFA/kg difference in the price received by
richer and poorer households. He concludes that timing of sales is indicative
of a process within which rural inequality becomes intensified. Similarly,
poor households paid a higher price (5 CFA/kg more) f or equivalent volumes
purchased. Almost everyone purchased some grain -- in small amounts and at
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frequent intervals. He found a direct relationship between cash outlay on
grain and economic strata.
All three of these studies conclude that there is a difference between
different groups of farmers in the timing of their grain marketing activities,
and that this increases economic inequality within the village. These
conclusions are similar to those of the production and marketing studies
discussed earlier. It is worth noting that the more detailed the analysis,
the more specific are the conclusions, and the clearer are the distinctions
between economically different behaviors.
The description of the first group of studies is useful for understanding
the various disposal patterns. The model of household behavior presented in
Section III, for example, includes many of the relationships that are
highlighted in the above descriptions: the relationship between the sales of
grain, the need for cash, and the level of household expenditures, or the
sales of grain and the sales of other goods. We need a methodology to
formally examine the relationships between these variables.
While the idea of dividing the year into periods because of the change in
prices over time is a good one, six-month periods are too long, and the
households are too varied for the conclusions to be significant. None of the
studies, except Matlon's, recognize that socioeconomic differences between
households may influence the timing of sales (though they all recognize the
converse).
The methodologies used in the economic anthropology literature are
particularly important because they fit grain marketing activities into the
larger socioeconomic environment of the household. In doing so they identify
important relationships between people, and between activities. The data
presented, however, are often too limited for the conclusions drawn.
The works reviewed all attempt to describe the grain marketing patterns of
households, and some try to explain the differences. In general, however,
they are not very comprehensive, perhaps because intraannual grain marketing
behavior is not their focus, but rather one piece of a larger analysis. More
importantly, their analyses are somewhat ad hoc. The hypotheses come from
either the conventional wisdom or implicit models that are not well explained,
and thus there is no way to evaluate their logic. Before we present our
model, however, Section II discusses the characteristics of the West African
farming economy.
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II. AGRICULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MANGA REGION
The major agricultural activities in the research area are crop production
and herding, supplemented by poultry raising. All the Mossi peasants grow
crops, even if only in small amounts. Those who can also raise goats, sheep,
and cattle. Almost all courtyards have some poultry. The cattle of the
nomadic herders also graze in the village and surrounding bush lands.
There are two distinct seasons: dry and wet. The dry season lasts from
November through April and the wet season from May through October, though the
first sporadic rains (the mango rains) begin in late March and April.
The predominant food crops are red and white sorghum, pearl millet, maize,
and peanuts, supplemented by rice, cowpeas, and bambara nuts (pois de terre).
Red sorghum, used to make beer, also serves as a cash crop. Farmers may grow
condiments, such as leaves and okra, and vegetables.
The nature of subsistence farming is such that foodcrops are both the
production and consumption goods of the agricultural household. Even
commercially oriented farms produce foodcrops for home consumption. Members
of the nuclear or extended family constitute the producing and consuming
units, although the composition of each unit may differ for each activity, and
may vary between families. Production and disposal (consumption and
distribution) occur simultaneously and continuously.
Although production occurs throughout the year, cropping activities,
including cultivating, planting, weeding, ridging, and finally harvesting and
threshing are concentrated between April and December. Soil preparation may
begin as early as February. Because the ideal planting date and growth
pattern for each crop are different, families can stagger their work on each.
At the end of the growing season new granaries are built and old ones
repaired. Once the rainfed crops are harvested and threshed, general household
repairs begin. Dry season production activities include gardening, weaving,
ceramics, forging, leather working, and sewing, as well as the year-round
raising of poultry and livestock.
In mid-August maize matures. This serves as the security crop for farmers
who do not produce enough of the other grains or who have sold too much during
1 These are the major activities of all peasant groups in Burkina Faso,
though the mixture of crops varies. Herders' activities are different.
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the year. The maize harvest is followed by early peanuts, and then in late
September/early October red sorghum is cut, dried and harvested. A late
variety of peanuts is ready in October, as are cowpeas and bambara nuts. In
mid-to-late November the pearl millet and white sorghum mature and are
harvested.
Consumption of agricultural and nonagricultural items occurs throughout
the year, though not necessarily in constant amounts. Additional expenditures
are made during certain seasons. The period of traditional feasts is from
November through March. It includes weddings, baptisms, funerals,
circumcisions, and chief's festivals, and sometimes Moslem holidays.
Christmas is celebrated by everyone. All of these events require special
expenditures for meals, beverages, new clothes and incidentals.
The prices of agricultural products have annual cycles. Grain prices fall
at harvest and rise steadily throughout the dry season and early parts of the
rainy season, peaking about a month before the first harvest. A similar trend
exists for other crops -- peanuts, cotton, and cowpeas. Animal prices are
lowest in May/June and begin to rise as grass becomes more abundant in the
rainy season. They peak in January/February.
The following list summarizes the household's major production and
consumption activities. Figure 1 depicts the timing of the activities in
relation to each other, and the price cycles of grains and animals.
1. Cropping activities result in a harvest which begins in August
and continues through December. The particular mix of crops
depends on tastes, soil characteristics, labor availability,
other inputs, and planning for future marketing needs.
2. The family may raise livestock and poultry.
3. Income earning activities include: selling grain, other crops,
livestock, poultry, artisan goods, vegetables, gathered
products, and labor and doing commerce.
4. Regular expenditures are made for household necessities: cola
nuts, tobacco, sauce materials, cloth, batteries, and other
consumer items.
5. Seasonal expenditures are made for feasts, taxes, and production
equipment.
FIGURE 1 THE AGRICULTURAL CALENDAR
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III. A RESOURCE ALLOCATION OF HOUSEHOLD MARKETING BEHAVIOR
Consider the following stylized story. A mixed farming household begins
the year (postharvest) with an amount of grain and a herd of animals which it
must allocate to different activities. It likes (and needs) to consume some
combination of grain, animals and other goods. The household's objective is
to maximize its well-being. The household knows that the prices of its goods
vary during the year. Its animals grow, reproduce, and die. If it has cash,
neighbors and relatives may try to borrow money, which may not be reimbursed.
This is the story behind the model discussed below.
The time frame of the model is one year, which is divided into two
periods.2 We assume that the household produces two goods, A and B -- grain
and animals. It begins the year with a "harvest" or endowment of each good A
and B.3 The household can consume, store or sell each of them. It also
consumes C, a nonhome produced item available at the market.
The household seeks to maximize its welfare which is a function of the
consumption of A, B, and C in each period. We shall assume an additively
separate utility function.
Max U(Ca, Cb ,CCc) + U(Ca Cb ,Cc(1)
1 1 1 2 2 2
where C = the amount of A consumed in period i,
ai
Cb = the amount of B consumed in period i,
bi
Cc = the amount of C consumed in period i.
ci
To subsist, the household must consume at least some minimum combination
of A and B in each period.
kaC + kCb > k(2)
al 1 -
k C + kbC k (3)
a a2  b > 2
2Clearly the year can be divided into more periods, but from two we can
generalize to more.
3T his assumption, that the goods are harvested at the same time, is only
somewhat realistic. Crops are not harvested simultaneously. The difference
in harvest time between crops may be an important reason for the sale of one
versus another - lack of availability.
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where ka, kb = the caloric content of A and B respectively,
k = the minimum caloric requirement for the household in period i.
Prices of all goods can vary between
constraint in each period. The value of
inventories, and cash saved must be less than





There is a budget
consumed, held in
to the value of the
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al C + P Cba1 b b
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c1 c a 1a 1 b b
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Where Pa = price of A in period i.
ai
Pb = price of B in period i.




= amount of good A held as inventory at the end of period 1.
Ib = amount of good B held as inventory at the
1 end of period 1.
S = the amount of cash saved at the end of period 1.
a = percent of reimbursed cash.
6d = net rate of growth of animals from period 1 to period 2.
Because the solution to this problem is rather involved, we only summarize
the results. To maximize its welfare, the household decides how much of its
wealth to consume today, and how much to transfer to the future. Both the
consumption and inventory decisions depend entirely on the expected rates of
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wealth to consume today, and how much to transfer to the future. Both the
consumption and inventory decisions depend entirely on the expected rates of
return of its various assets, A, B, and cash, taking into account the expected
growth in the herd (B), and expected depreciation of cash held due to
unreimbursed loans. The solution involves converting (by sale) all assets
into the one whose expected return is highest. Only if the highest expected
return is the same for two or more of the assets will the household hold a
combination of the goods.
Although this model allows us to examine the role of prices in the
household's decision of what goods to sell at different times during the year,
the deterministic form of our model has some severe limitations. Usually, a
household does not sell all its grain to invest in animals (or vice versa).
Few households have an all-or-nothing sales strategy. This type of behavior
is inconsistent with the reality of rural life.
The model presented includes no risk aversion, and it considers all goods
as totally "fungible."4 Farmers are risk averse, however. The use of grain
for subsistence affects a producer's decision whether to sell all his produce
at one point in time because he knows he will need cash to buy grain later
during the year.
A similar model with risk aversion would result in the household holding a
more balanced portfolio from one period to the next. The inventory of each
good would change in response to relative prices, but it would not be an
all-or-nothing adjustment. A household would sell the good whose relative
price was expected to increase the least. Regardless of whether it is animals
or grain, we would not expect a household to sell it all. The balance in the
portfolio would be maintained both because the farmer cannot be absolutely
sure of future prices, and because of the security value of grain and the
savings value of animals. Farmers' decisions would reflect the trade-off s
among income, security and risk.
4 Another limitation of the model is the fact that it covers only one
year. We know that in reality farmers make decisions regarding carry-over
stocks. This is particularly important in the pre-harvest period, when the
prices of crops are high. The farmer must make choices between immediate
revenue, storage costs, and the risk that his coming harvest will be
insufficient to meet his family's consumption needs. To be more realistic,
the welfare function in the model should include these trade-off s.
13
There is no explicit sales variable in this model. The key decision
variables are inventories. However, this does not mean that sales are absent
from the model. Selling (or buying) is a means by which households adjust
their inventories to their desired levels: if the household wants to hold
less than it has, it sells; if it wants to hold more, it buys. It is not
possible to obtain a determinate solution for the effect of prices on sales
without knowing the utility function.
Another important result from our model is that the solution is
independent of the size of the endowment. Therefore, for a given price regime
the optimal strategy is the same regardless of the household's endowment or
wealth. No doubt, the household's endowment does affect the absolute amount
of each good consumed and the amount of goods held from one period to the
next. It does not, however, affect the choice of good.
We can extend this result to households with different levels of wealth
(socioeconomic status), or different initial asset mixes. It implies that all
households facing the same rates of return for the different assets will hold
inventories in the same goods.
What can we say about sales patterns? Marketing patterns depend on the
interaction between desired inventories and endowment (initial inventories).
Therefore, sales patterns are a function of prices (which determine inventory
strategy), endowments, and consumption patterns.
Consider the following example. Prices are such that the desired pattern
of inventories is to hold grain and not animals or cash. In such a situation
all households will sell their animals and buy grain. Obviously, those with
more animals will sell more, and therefore increase their inventory of grain
by more than will households with fewer animals. In the second period,
everyone will sell grain. How much will depend upon the level of consumption
of each in both periods. A more determinate result is unfortunately not
possible.
Thus, the results of the model predict that the relative prices of the
different goods a household produces affect the relative quantities of
inventories of each good in the different periods. In the first period the
household will convert some of its assets into the good whose relative price
is expected to rise the most.5 It also predicts that although the amounts
5 The precise balance depends on a combination of risk and the expected
return of the different assets.
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of other goods available to the household do not influence which goods are
held, they do affect the magnitude of the inventory changes. Marketing grain
is one way the household adjusts its inventories to their desired levels. We
hypothesize that the same variables which affect inventory behavior also
affect grain sales.
Specifically, we hypothesize that:
1. The marketing patterns for grain reflect the relative price of grain
vis A vis the other revenue generating opportunities farmers have.
Referring to Figure 1, we note that the price of grain relative to
animals is higher in the harvest period than in February or March. Thus if
farmers are responding to relative prices, and have animals which they could
sell, it would be more economic to sell grain just after harvest than in the
festival season (January-March). This leads us to the following hypothesis
about forced sales.
2. Socioeconomic status of farmers has an important effect on grain
marketing patterns in so far as it is a proxy for the alternatives farmers
have.
a) Wealthier farmers, because they have other means of
generating income, can sell grain when it is most
advantageous, in terms of relative prices.
b) Poorer farmers, because they have fewer revenue
alternatives, must sell grain at less opportune times.
IV. INTRAANNUAL MARKETING BEHAVIOR OF MANGA FARMERS
Although the model predicts that each household has the same strategy, the
marketing patterns which result from the execution of this strategy differ
according to the economic constraints within which households operate -- the
resource endowments, and the prevailing price regime. The amount of a good
sold in the first period depends on its price, its expected price change, the
total amount of each good available, and of course the individual household' s
utility function.
The marketing pattern is the combination of marketing activities that
occur during the year: the juxtaposition of the buying and the selling of
grain, and the buying and selling of other goods produced by the household.
It incorporates the timing of marketing activities -- what occurs at low
15
prices and what at high prices -- and the relative magnitudes of the
transactions.6
First we examine the data on types of transactions, socioeconomic status,
and the net marketing position of households to determine whether and how the
marketing patterns of households differ. Then we look at whether the timing
of sales supports the forced sales hypothesis, and whether wealth explains
differences in the timing of sales. Finally, to examine which households can
be considered forced to sell, we look at the timing of other revenue-
generating activities in relation to grain sales. Through the individual
analyses we have a more complete picture of the relationship between grain
sales, other economic activities and household wealth.
When Do Households Market Grain?
To begin, we consider the grain sales of the entire sample together (Table
1). The largest percentage of grain is sold during the harvest season. Sales
then taper off until prices reach their peak in July/August when there is an
increase in sales until the next harvest. Almost 60% of all grain is sold
during the first six months after harvest. This behavior is in contrast to
Hays' findings for Nigeria (30% sold in the first six months).
The data show a relatively even flow of purchases throughout the year,
with a slightly higher percentage in the first and third quarters. Further
analysis will show the pattern of different subgroups within the sample. 7
We classify the household's aggregate marketing pattern according to two
criteria: what kind of transactions are made (sells only, buys only, buys and
sells, or doesn't trade); and whether the household is a net seller, net
buyer, or neither.
The net seller/buyer categories can be defined either by the volume sold
or by the value sold. Table 2 compares these two categorizations for our
sample. Six households are net volume sellers but net value buyers. They are
from the two poorest wealth groups. The other 110 households remain in the
same category regardless of the method of calculation.
6An additional dimension is the particular crop that is traded. Hays,
for example, found that large and small households in Northern Nigeria choose
differently between millet and sorghum when deciding which to sell.




ANNUAL GRAIN TRANSACTIONS OF THE SAMPLE
OCTOBER 1979 - SEPTEMBER 1980
Jan-Mar Apr-June July-Sept
Oct-Dec Dry Hot Wet Annual
Harvest Season Season Season Total
rain Sales: 5409 4136 2735 3831 16116
(in kg.)
Percent of 33% 26% 17% 24%
nnual Sales
rain Purchases 2995 1875 2320 1854 9044
(in kg.)
Percent of 33% 21% 26% 20%
Annual Purchases
Net Sales 2414 2261 415 1977 7067
(in kg.)




SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS IN DIFFERENT NET BUYER/SELLER CATEGORIES
Net Value Equal Net Value
Buyer Seller
Net Volume Buyer of grain 37 0 0
Equal 0 2 a 0
Net Volume Seller of grain 6 0 71
aThese households made no transactions.
TABLE 3
NET VALUE POSITION OF HOUSEHOLDS
WHO FOLLOW DIFFERENT TRANSACTION PATTERNS
Net Value Categories
Grain
Transaction Net Value Net Value
Categories Buyer of Grain Equal Seller
No Transaction 0 2 0
Sells Only 0 0 26
Buys Only 8 0 0
Sells and Buys 35 0 45
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Table 3 shows the net value position of the sample households who follow
different transaction patterns. The majority (90%) of the sample either sells
only or both buys and sells grain during the year. Tables 4 and 5 present the
transaction and net value categories (respectively) for households who are in
different socioeconomic groups.8
It seems clear from these tables that in general poorer households are net
purchasers of grain and wealthier households are net sellers. Of the
households who both buy and sell about 35% are in the poorest category. From
Table 6 we see that 71% of them are net value buyers. Proportionally more of
the wealthier households are net sellers than net buyers.
Finally we look at the net value position of households in different
wealth groups during different times of the year, Table 7.
Wealthier households are net sellers throughout the year. Poorer
households are net sellers early in the year and net buyers in the last two
quarters. The households in the two middle wealth groups also tend to sell
early, but a smaller proportion of them are net buyers in the last two
quarters.
It is clear from these tables that there are important differences in the
marketing behavior of households who are in different socioeconomic groups.
We observe a tendency for poorer households to sell proportionally more of
their grain earlier in the year than wealthier households, and to purchase
proportionally more later in the year. Wealthier households seem to sell at
both the beginning and end of the year (only two households in group 4 are net
buyers).
Are Farmers Forced to Sell?
The conventional wisdom is that "farmers are forced to sell grain just
after the harvest when prices are low." The term "forced sales" refers to an
assertion that the farmer is selling grain to meet financial obligations which
come immediately after the harvest, such as repaying loans and paying for
traditional feasts and funerals. It implies that the farmer would prefer to
sell something else but sells grain because he has nothing else to sell, and
needs cash. We shall examine two variations of this hypothesis.
8 The households were grouped according to relative amounts of capital
goods -- bicycles, plows, other agricultural equipment, furniture, etc.
19
TABLE 4
NET VALUE POSITION FROM GRAIN SALES OF HOUSEHOLDS
IN DIFFERENT SOCIOECONOMIC CATEGORIES
Socioeconomic Groups
Net Value Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Categories Poorer Wealthiest
Net Value Buyer 23 9 9 2
N=43
Equal 2 0 0 0
N= 2
Net Value Seller 12 20 24 15
N=71
Total 37 29 33 17
TABLE 5
GRAIN TRANSACTIONS BEHAVIOR OF HOUSEHOLDS
IN DIFFERENT SOCIOECONOMIC CATEGORIES
Socioeconomic Groups
rain
Transaction Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Total
Categories Poorest Wealthiest
No Transactions 2 0 0 0 2
Sells only 4 8 6 8 26
uys only 3 2 3 0 8
Sells and Buys 28 19 24 9 80
Total 37 29 33 17 116
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TABLE 6
NET VALUE POSITION OF HOUSEHOLDS
IN DIFFERENT WEALTH GROUPS
WHO BOTH BUY AND SELL GRAIN
Socioeconomic Groups
Net Value roup 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Categories Poorest Wealthiest
Net Value Buyer 20 7 6 2
N-35
et Value Seller 8 12 18 7
N-45
TABLE 7
NET VALUE POSITION IN DIFFERENT PERIODS
FOR HOUSEHOLDS IN DIFFERENT WEALTH GROUPS
Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-June July-Sept
Socioeconomic Net Value Dry Hot Wet
Groups Position Harvest Season Season Season
Group 1 Net Buyer 6 9 24 18
Poorest Equala 6 13 9 9
N=37 Net Seller 25 15 4 10
Group 2 Net Buyer 3 5 9 15
N=29 Equal 5 4 6 5
Net Seller 21 20 14 9
Group 3 Net Buyer 10 6 12 12
N=33 Equal 3 5 8 8
Net Seller 20 22 13 13
Group 4 Net Buyer 2 2 2 4
Wealthiest Equal 2 3 8 3
N=17 Net Seller 13 12 7 10
w
aUsually equal means did not transact.
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3a. Poorer farmers are less able to take advantage of the price
cycle for grain than wealthier farmers. They make a larger
proportion of their grain sales in the harvest period, when
prices are low, than wealthier farmers.
3b. Wealthier farmers make a larger proportion of their sales just
before the harvest when prices are higher.
Hypothesis 3a is tested by doing an ordinary least squares regression with
"proportion of grain sold in period 1" (the harvest period) as the dependent
variable and the wealth indicator (the four socioeconomic groups) as the
independent variable. If the coefficient on wealth is less than zero then we
cannot reject the hypothesis. 9
Percent Grain Sales = .541 - .069 Wealth (6)
in Period 1 (.075) (.030)
N = 116 R2 = .04
These results show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that poorer
families probably do make a larger proportion of their sales in the period
just after harvest than do wealthier ones. 1
Table 8 shows the percentage of grain sales and purchases occurring in
different periods for each socioeconomic group. We note that households in
wealth groups 1,2, and 4 all make the largest proportion of their grain sales
in the first quarter.11 During the first half of the year the poorest two
groups make about 70% of their sales, and the wealthiest two groups about 50%
of their sales.
Using chi-squared statistics we can test the hypothesis that households in
the different socioeconomic groups behave similarly. The chi-squared
statistics for the percent of grain sold and the percent of grain bought show
that households in different socioeconomic groups do behave differently. The
statistics also show that there are significant differences within each of the
9The standard errors are in parentheses.
10 The results do not change significantly when we omit the households
which never sell during the year, although the R2 increases to .08.
llfwe do an analysis of variance, the mean for wealth group 3 in
period 1 is not significantly different from the mean for period 2, so we
could generalize this statement to all groups.
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TABLE 8
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF ANNUAL GRAIN TRANSACTIONS
IN DIFFERENT QUARTERS
FOR HOUSEHOLDS IN DIFFERENT SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS
Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-June July-Sept
Na Dry Hot Wet
Harvest Season Season Season
Group 1 - Poorest
% of Grain Sold 32 57 27 5 11
% of Grain Bought 31 16 17 39 28
% of Net Sales 35 25 26 54 -4
Group 2
% of Grain Sold 27 43 33 13 11
% of Grain Bought 21 12 14 33 41
% of Net Sales 29 182 17 -82 -17
Group 3
% of Grain Sold 30 31 33 19 17
% of Grain Bought 29 26 18 23 33
% of Net Sales 33 33 23 26 18
Group 4 - Wealthiest
% of Grain Sold 17 34 21 14 31
% of Grain Bought 9 29 28 6 37








1029.18 with 9 degrees of freedom





315 degrees of freedom
261 degrees of freedom
aWe computed percentages only for households which did the type
of transaction at least once during the year.
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different groups. Because the data on percent of net sales include negative
values, we cannot use the chi-squared test. However, by inspection it seems
that the same conclusions apply.
Hypothesis 3b is the flip side of 3a. To test whether wealthier farmers
sell proportionally more grain than poor farmers in the fourth quarter we use
an equation similar to 6, but with "the proportion sold in period 4", the wet
season, as the dependent variable.
Percent Grain Sales = .0057 + .062 Wealth (7)
in Period 4 (.0506) (.020)
N=116 R2 =.08
Equation 7 suggests that wealthier farmers do sell proportionally more in
period 4, when grain prices are highest.12 The results from testing
hypotheses 3a and 3b suggest that wealthier farmers are better able to take
advantage of the grain price cycle in choosing when to sell grain.
To shed further light on the question of forced sales we consider the
reasons why farmers said they sold their grain. Table 9 indicates the
frequency with which farmers said they made a sale for different reasons. The
table presents the reasons for selling grain and for selling animals. The
major reason for selling grain is to purchase necessities for the household.
Second in importance is to pay for a feast or ceremony, and third is to save
money. Little grain is sold to reimburse loans, to buy livestock, to invest
in agriculture, or to pay taxes. In addition to financing household
necessities, feasts and ceremonies, major reasons for animal sales are to buy
grain (especially between April and September), to pay taxes, and to save
money. The general temporal patterns of the reasons are similar. Most sales
of both goods occur in the first and second periods.
These data suggest that although we find that households do make a large
portion of their grain sales in the first two periods, they are not for the
reason supposed in the conventional wisdom: reimbursing loans and paying
taxes. In general, it seems that animals are sold when larger sums of money
are needed, and grain is sold to obtain smaller sums.
12These results do not change significantly when we omit the householdsi
that never sell.
TABLE 9
THE FREQUENCY OF REASONS GIVEN FOR
INDIVIDUAL GRAIN SALES AND INDIVIDUAL ANIMAL SALES
% of Grain Sales for a Given Reason % of Animal Sales for a Given Reason
N-565 N770
Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-June July-Sept Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-June July-Sept
Total Dry Hot Wet Total Dry Hot Wet
Reason Harvest Season Season Season Harvest Season Season Season
Buy Food 1.2 1.2 0 0 0 9.0 2.3 .9 2.7 3.1
ay Taxes 1.6 0 .5 .9 .2 3.0 .1 .9 1.0 1.0
uy Household
Necessities 58.7 23.4 18.6 8.8 7.9 52.5 21.5 13.6 9.1 8.3
Pay for Ceremonies 12.5 2.5 4.2 3.9 1.9 4.5 .8 1.4 1.0 1.3
uy Livestock 1.5 .2 .4 .7 .2 1.9 .3 .6 .9 .1
Invest in
Agriculture 5.0 .9 .6 1.3 2.2 3.7 .9 .4 1.5 .9
Reimburse Loan .6 .4 .2 0 0 .8 .5 .1 .1 .1
Purchase Gift 2.7 .2 2.3 .2 0 1.5 .1 1.0 .1 .3
Pay School Fees .6 .4 .2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pay Traditional
Healer 3.2 1.4 1.8 0 0 3.4 2.1 .9 .4 0
Save Money 5.8 1.4 1.4 .7 2.3 8.2 3.6 3.1 .5 1.0
Other 6.6 1.8 3.0 .5 1.3 10.0 2.1 5.3 1.8 .8
Total 100.0 33.9 33.4 16.9 15.8 100.0 35.3 28.2 19.2 16.9
t .
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Trade-offs Between Assets to Generate Revenue
Finally, whether or not households are forced to sell grain depends on
their alternatives for generating revenue. Thus, we consider grain sales
within the larger context of the household economy. The household earns
income by selling grain, other crops, and animals, and by selling its labor
for agriculture, making artisan products, selling household goods, etc. The
model predicts that there is a trade-off in the use of these different assets
for generating revenue, and that the asset used depends on current and
expected relative prices of all the different assets. Therefore we expect a
trade-off between the use of grain and other individual assets for revenue
generation at different times during the year. For example, during the first
quarter, from October through December, although grain prices are at their
annual low and will rise in all the subsequent periods, animal prices are also
rising and will begin to fall again in March/April. Therefore we would expect
animals to be sold in preference to grain in the second quarter, the dry
season. Grain might very well be sold in preference to animals at harvest,
the first quarter. In spite of the fact that grain prices are at their annual
low, it could be more economic to sell grain and hold onto animals for several
more months. Obviously if the household does not have animals it cannot
choose not to sell them. It would sell grain in period 1 without saving
animals to sell in period 2.
Because of our relatively small sample, and the multidimensional nature of
these hypotheses, they are very difficult to test in a rigorous way. Table 10
shows the relative importance of these different sources of revenue in the
four different time periods. For the three lower socioeconomic groups, grain
sales are always less than 30% of the revenue for the period. Animals, on the
other hand, represent an average of 35-57% of revenue generated in the first
three quarters and 13-32% in the fourth quarter. Nonagricultural revenue is
important for the poorer three socioeconomic groups in the fourth quarter.
Sales of other crops (cowpeas, peanuts, shea nuts, etc.) are most important in
the fourth quarter relative to other periods.
In addition to the hypotheses derived from the model we would like to be
able to address two basic questions:
1. Do the different socioeconomic groups behave similarly in each
period? Do they use their assets similarly?
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TABLE 10
PERCENTAGE OF REVENUE OBTAINED FROM DIFFERENT SOURCES
FOR HOUSEHOLDS IN DIFFERENT SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS
Oct-Dec Jan-Mar Apr-June July-Sept
Dry Hot Wet
Harvest Season Season Season
Group 1 - Poorest
Grain .29 .22 .07 .12
Animals .41 .45 .40 .27
Other Crops .16 .11 .12 .27
Off-Farm Income .14 .22 .41 .34
Mean Revenue 4542 4110 4600 5295
(in CFA)
Group 2
Grain .27 .25 .14 .15
Animals .39 .48 .41 .23
Other Crops .18 .07 .09 .27
Off-Farm Income .16 .20 .36 .36
Mean Revenue 10368 8665 12491 8591
(in CFA)
Group 3
Grain .16 .27 .26 .11
Animals .50 .36 .34 .33
Other Crops .18 .10 .17 .21
Off-Farm Income .16 .27 .23 .35
Mean Revenue 15176 11404 8020 9372
(in CFA)
Group 4 - Wealthiest
Grain .36 .23 .28 .35
Animals .41 .58 .33 .17
Other Crops .07 .04 .09 .29
Off-Farm Income .16 .15 .29 .18
Mean Revenue 12609 18786 11082 18592
(in CFA)
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2. How do the marketing patterns (percent of revenue earned from each
source) differ from one period to another?
For periods 1, 2, and 3 all the wealth groups seem to use their assets
similarly. In period 4, however, the wealthiest households seem to deviate
from the patterns of the other three groups. They earn almost 70% of their
income from selling crops.13
To address the question of trade-off s between different sources of income
during the year, we look at the relative importance of specific sources at
different times. Except for group 3, animals are most important in the dry
season, behavior consistent with the price structure discussed above.
Off-farm income is especially important in period 3, when people have time and
when the larger farms are paying to have their fields prepared. For groups 1,
2, and 3, it is also important in the wet season, for similar reasons. Other
crops play a very small role in revenue generation except for the wealthiest
households in the fourth quarter.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Although the poorest households in the sample have alternatives to selling
grain in the first quarter, that is when they make a large proportion of their
grain sales. Wealthier households make a smaller proportion of their sales at
harvest, but do earn a substantial portion of their revenue from grain sales
at that time.
The households that can be considered "forced to sell" in the extreme are
the 35 households who both buy and sell during the year, but are net buyers.
For all of them the prices at which they sell are lower than the prices at
which they buy. They definitely need the grain for consumption. Twenty-eight
of them, 80%, are in the poorest category.
Why does the poor farmer not buy grain when prices are low? To buy grain
one must have cash. The poor farmer uses his grain in the first two quarters
to generate cash, as well as his available animals and cash crops. He has few
opportunities for off-farm income between October and March. Therefore, he
13 A profile analysis of these data support these conclusions. The
patterns in periods 2 and 3 are not significantly different for the different
socioeconomic groups. In the fourth quarter group 4 does behave significantly
differently.
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must sell to meet his minimum obligations. He then buys when other revenue
generating opportunities are more abundant -- and when grain is more expensive.
If we assume that each household approximates an optimal allocation of its
resources to different activities, what can we say about the difference in
their marketing patterns? Wealthier households have more of all assets and
interact more in the market. Wealthier households obtain proportionally more
of their revenue from grain sales than do poorer households. Poorer
households rely more heavily on off-farm income. Although the Manga area is
surplus in grain production, households earn a larger proportion of their
income from selling animals than from selling grain or from any other
activity, regardless of wealth.
And finally, it should be obvious from the analysis and from the data
presented that marketing patterns themselves are very difficult to categorize
and to analyze. Grain is only one of many ways to earn money and only one of
many assets which must be managed. The poorer farmer may have some of each
asset, but he has less of them all. He is more constrained in his execution
of globally optimal strategies. The wealthier farmer, less constrained by
subsistence, can use each of his assets more optimally.
The substitution between assets points to the importance of coordinating
policies in the crop and livestock subsectors. Price policies which favor
grain over livestock will have repercussions on the sales of livestock and
vice versa. In a similar vein, these results have implications for policies
which tend to favor cash crops over subsistence crops (as for cotton producing
areas in Burkina Faso). Among poor producers increased cash crop production
is likely to reduce grain sales; for wealthier producers increases in cash
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